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PROMISE UTILITY DOCTRINE AND
COMPATIBILITY UNDER NAFTA:
EXPROPRIATION AND CHAPTER 11
CONSIDERATIONS
Freedom-Kai Phillips*
ABSTRACT: The 2013 filing by Eli Lilly of a notice of arbitration under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA relating to the application of the promise utility doctrine in Canadian
jurisprudence brought to light latent tensions relating to domestic patent standards,
perceived barriers to innovation, and international investment standards. This paper
explores applicable NAFTA obligations and patent regimes in an effort to identify points
of convergence and divergence, and argues that the promise utility doctrine while
differentiated on procedural grounds domestically has significant substantive alignment
across jurisdictions, and is overall consistent with the standard of treatment established
under NAFTA. The promise utility doctrine, which is grounded in a harmonized view of
the theoretical underpinnings of the patent bargain, progressively articulates the enduring
need to maintain highly-specific disclosure standards to support sound patent practices,
maintain ongoing innovation, and dissuade otherwise speculative or suppressive
practices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Invalidation of a patent for lack of utility based on the promise utility
doctrine identifies important questions pertaining to the compatibility of such an
approach with pre-existing trade obligations, particularly those established under
the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).1 In 2013, Eli Lilly &
Company (“Eli Lilly”) filed a notice of arbitration under NAFTA claiming that
the recent invalidation of two patents based on the application of the promise
doctrine was tantamount to direct or indirect expropriation.2 This paper will
explore the validity and compatibility of the promise utility doctrine as
articulated in Canadian jurisprudence with investor-state protections as
established under NAFTA through a review of the current Chapter 11 dispute
initiated by Eli Lilly over the invalidation of patents for Zyprexa and Strattera.
First, a brief outline of the Chapter 11 dispute will be offered as background,
including both patent and procedural historical summaries. Second, applicable
investor-state protections as established under NAFTA are summarized. Third,
patent standards across NAFTA jurisdictions are discussed with particular
emphasis on highlighting the evolution and alignment of the promise utility
doctrine. Fourth, the promise utility doctrine is critically appraised to assess
consistency with established NAFTA obligations, with specific emphasis on
direct and in-direct expropriation. Finally, concluding thoughts are offered,
highlighting points of convergence and divergence. The promise utility doctrine
marks a progressive evolution in the assessment of a patent’s utility which, while
initially raising prima facie concerns over incompatibility, remains consistent
with NAFTA obligations.
While consistent with the position of the Government of Canada in the
dispute overall, it is on the scope of Intellectual Property (“IP”) system alignment
and the applicability of the police powers exception to expropriation where our
positions slightly diverge. I assert that IP regimes under NAFTA jurisdictions are
far more harmonized theoretically and substantively than previously recognized,
with mechanical deviation relating to the operative components of the regime to
address a utility inquiry acknowledged. I also note the unique market
circumstances which have fostered the promise utility doctrine. Furthermore, the
fair, non-arbitrary and transparent judicial application of the patent bargain
through the promise utility doctrine fits within the police powers exception to
expropriation. International law cannot be utilized to justify dilution of the patent
system to the point where speculative patent practices are encouraged or
accepted. The promise utility doctrine marks an inflection point for patent
interpretation in an age of unbounded innovation, an evolutionary step rightly
grounded in a harmonized view of the theoretical underpinnings of the patent
bargain, and a progressive approach to patent interpretation which benefits the
global patent community.

1
2

North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 639.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, UNCT/14/12, (Sept. 12, 2013).
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II. BACKGROUND
This section aims to briefly outline the factual elements which underlay the
dispute as background. First, the historical backdrop underlying the successful
granting of Canadian Patent No. 2,041,113 for “Zyprexa,” and Canadian Patent
No. 2,209,735 for “Strattera” is summarized. Second, the procedural history
relating to challenges to the aforementioned patents is discussed. The evidentiary
basis supporting and the procedural steps which led to the invalidation of the
Zyprexa and Strattera patents provides valuable context and insight to consider in
light of the Investor-State expectation of fair and equitable treatment (“FET”).
A. Patent History: Zyprexa and Strattera

Founded in 1876, Eli Lilly has progressively established a long history of
conducting innovative research and development in the pharmaceutical sector,3
and like other cost-intensive sectors, is highly dependent upon the use of IP
rights system, particularly patents, to recuperate the significant investment
associated
with
drug
development.4
Zyprexa
(olanzapine),
a
thienobenzodiazepine derivative commercially used in the treatment of
schizophrenia, was first developed, clinically tested, and patented in the United
Kingdom,5 leading to patent applications in a total of eighty-one jurisdictions
including Canada and the United States.6 Canadian Patent No. 2,041,113 (the
“113 patent”) for Zyprexa was filed April 24, 1991 and issued July 14, 1998, and
covers the pharmaceutical application of 2-methyl-thieno-benzodiazepine to treat
disorders to the central nervous system, schizophrenia, schizophreniform disease,
acute mania, and mild anxiety states.7 The 113 patent was a “selection patent,”
insomuch as it selected specific compounds based on a previous originating
(“genus”) patent, Canadian Patent No. 1,075,687 (the “687 patent”), which
covered a widespread set of compounds based on the common three-ring
molecular structure “thienobenzodiazepine.”8 United States Patent No. 5,229,382
was filed May 22, 1992,9 and issued July 20, 1993, and carries with it an
equivalent scope.10 Following regulatory approval, Zyprexa entered the market in
1996 and gained widespread application for treatment of schizophrenia.11
Strattera (atomoxetine), an early non-stimulant based treatment for attentiondeficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), grew out of early research on the use of
atomoxetine for treatment of depression.12 United States Patent No. 5,658,590
3 James H. Madison, Manufacturing Pharmaceuticals: Eli Lilly and Company, 18761948, 18 BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 72, 72-78 (1989).
4 Paul Grootendorst, Patents and Other Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation, in
Elsevier Encyclopedia of Health Economics (2014).
5 U.K., Patent No. 9009229.7 (issued April 25, 1990).
6 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Claimant’s Memorial UNCT/14/2, Lilly Obtaining Patent, ¶
84-85 (Sept. 29, 2014).
7 Canada, Patent No. 02,041,113 (issued April 24, 1991).
8 Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2011] F.C. 1288, ¶ 1-2.
9 U.S., Patent No. 07/690,143 (issued April 23, 1991).
10 U.S., Patent No. 5,229,382, (issued July 20, 1993).
11 Canada, Claimant’s Memorial, supra note 6, ¶ 92.
12 Id. ¶ 118.
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was filed on January 11, 1995,13 and issued August 19, 1997, and covers the
“method of use” of tomoxetine for treatment of ADHD and impulse-type
disorders.14 Filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty on January 4, 1996 and
published July 18, 1996, Canadian Patent No. 2,209,735 (the “735 patent”) was
issued October 1, 2002.15 Principal evidence for the filing was a supportive
seven-week study conducted by Massachusetts General Hospital (“MGH”),
which was provided to Health Canada to support approval but was not disclosed
as a component of the patent application.16
B. Procedural History: Zyprexa and Strattera

Both Zyprexa and Strattera follow a common procedural path resulting from
a challenge filed by a generic drug manufacturer, with the former being in retort
to claims of infringement and the latter being pre-emptive in nature. In the case
of the 113 patent for Zyprexa (olanzapine), Eli Lilly claimed Novopharm, a
Canadian generic drug manufacturer, was infringing the aforementioned patent
in the production of “novo-olanzapine.” This question was first addressed by
Justice O’Reilly at the Federal Court [trial judgment], with his judgment of
October 5, 2009. Justice O’Reilly dismissed the claim of infringement on the
basis that the 113 patent was not a valid selection patent, as at the time of patent,
Eli Lilly had not included sufficient information to demonstrate or soundly
predict the utility described in the patent application, and that olanzapine was
encompassed in the previous 687 patent which lasted between 1980 to 1997.17
The trial judgment was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) in
the decision delivered by Justice Layden-Stevenson on July 21, 2010 [FCA
Judgment], which held that Justice O’Reilly erred in his interpretive approach
towards selection patents, and therefore, had fatally undermined the analysis of
utility.18 As such, the questions of utility and the sufficiency of disclosure in the
patent were remitted back to the Federal Court for proper consideration.19
In the follow-up decision by the Federal Court [second trial judgment],20
Justice O’Reilly applied the guidance provided by the FCA in considering utility
which included: (i) affirmation that a selection patent must provide a “substantial
advantage,” have all selected members exhibit the advantageous qualities, and
have the selection be made on the basis of this “quality of a special character,”21
and (ii) that while a mere scintilla of utility is generally sufficient, where a patent
makes an explicit promise, the principle consideration must shift to “whether the
13

U.S., Patent No. 08/371,341 (issued Jan. 11, 1995).
U.S., Patent No. 5,658,590 (issued Aug. 19, 1997).
15 Canada, Patent No. 2,209,735 (issued July 18, 1996).
16 Canada, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, ¶ 50; Canada, Claimant’s Memorial, supra
note 6, ¶ 119.
17 Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2009] FC 1018, ¶ 154.
18 Eli Lilly Canada Inc v Novopharm Ltd, [2010] FCA 197, ¶ 108-109.
19 Id. ¶ 124.
20 Eli Lilly Canada Inc v Novopharm Ltd., [2011] FC 1288.
21 Id. ¶ 81-82; Novopharm, supra note 18, ¶ 19-22; Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc v
Apotex Inc, [2008] SCC 61, [2008] 3 SCR 265 [Sanofi-Synthelabo], relying on Re I.G.
Farbenindustrie AG’s Patents (1930), 47 RPC 289 (Ch D).
14
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invention does what the patent promises it will do.”22 As a selection patent, the
113 patent was required to demonstrate utility in terms of fulfillment of a specific
promise of a substantial advantage based on a sound prediction of that promise at
the time the patent was filed.23 Justice O’Reilly constituted the promise of the
113 patent to be that “olanzapine treats schizophrenia patients. . . in a markedly
superior fashion with a better side-effects profile than other known
antipsychotics.” Citing insufficient clinical studies and lack of a sound line of
reasoning, Justice O’Reilly concluded that indeed, the 113 patent did not meet
this promise at the time of patent.24 Leave was denied to both the FCA, and the
Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”).25
Regarding the 735 patent for Strattera (atomoxetine), Teva Canada Limited
(formerly Novopharm) initiated an action in Federal Court seeking a finding of
invalidity for the aforementioned patent,26 opening the door for commercial sales
of the generic equivalent. On September 14, 2010, Justice Barnes first
recognized the 735 patent to be indicating an “inventive new use” of a known
compound.27 Second, in considering utility, he cited Consolboard, AZT and the
reasoning articulated in the consideration of the 113 patent for Zypreza; he
reiterated that utility is a product of the invention doing what is claimed for a
person skilled in the art, based on sufficient evidence or sound prediction at the
time of patent.28 Utility is identified as not equitable with the treatment working
for all patients, nor working for only a single patient. As noted by Justice Barnes,
disclosure must sufficiently demonstrate effectiveness or support a sound
prediction.29 Where a sound prediction is made, he cited AZT, indicating that
disclosure in the patent must include both “factual data” and the articulated “line
of reasoning” underlying the sound prediction to satisfy the quid pro quo of the
patent.30 As the 735 patent was based on a sound prediction and as the MGH
study had significant limitations,31 and was neither disclosed nor referenced in
the patent application, the patent was found to fail for “want of disclosure.”32 The
trial findings were affirmed upon appeal, with the July 5, 2011 decision of the
FCA reiterating that where the factual basis supporting the predicted utility is not

22 Novopharm, [2011] FC 1288, ¶ 84; Novopharm, supra note 18, ¶ 74-77; Consolboard
Inc v MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 504, 56 C.P.R. (2d) 145; Pfizer
Canada Inc v Canada (Minister of Health), [2008] FCA 108.
23 Novopharm, [2011] FC 1288, ¶ 85-88; Novopharm, supra note 18, ¶ 78.
24 Novopharm, [2011] FC 1288, ¶ 209-213, 273.
25 Canada, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, ¶ 64; Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm
Ltd., [2012] F.C.A. 232; Eli Lilly Canada Inc., et al. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2013] CanLII 26762
(SCC).
26 Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2010] F.C. 915 [Can.].
27 Id. ¶ 88.
28 Id. ¶ 91-93; Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd., [1981] 1
S.C.R. 504, 56 C.P.R. (2d) 145, 524-526 (Can.); Novopharm, supra note 18; Apotex Inc. v.
Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] SCC 77, 21 C.P.R. (4th) 499, ¶ 70-71 (Can.).
29 Id. ¶ 112, 116.
30 Id. ¶ 117.
31 Id. ¶ 102.
32 Id. ¶ 94, 120.
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disclosed, this is a breach of the public bargain underpinning patentability.33
Leave to the SCC was denied on December 8, 2011.34

III. APPLICABLE OBLIGATIONS UNDER NAFTA
This section summarizes the applicable obligations of the Parties as
established under NAFTA. First, the standard of treatment as established under
Article 1105 is provided in conjunction with considerations relating to national
treatment and most favoured nation (“MFN”) under Articles 1102 and 1103
respectively. Second, expropriation under Article 1110 is discussed. Lastly,
issues relating to IP rights as outlined in Articles 1701 and 1709 are summarized.
The obligations under NAFTA establish a common framework for facilitation
and regulation of trade based on principles of FET treatment.
A. Standard of Treatment

FET is a longstanding pillar of international economic law which has
become the most frequently invoked standard in investor-state disputes.35 Article
11 of NAFTA encompasses a collection of obligations relating to investment,
which applies to investors and investments of another Party occurring in the
territory of a Party.36 First, each Party is obliged to accord “no less favourable
treatment” to investors and investments of a foreign Party than is accorded to
domestic counterparts in like circumstances.37 Second, each Party is obliged to
provide equivalent treatment to foreign investors and investments as is provided
in like circumstances to any other nation – Party or non-Party.38 The standards of
national treatment in Article 1102 and MFN in Article 1103 are intended to
create an even-handed standard of treatment governing investments made under
the treaty,39 which provides for no negative legislative or regulatory
differentiation between foreign and domestic investment and discourages lessfavourable treatment.40 Third, Article 1105 establishes a minimum standard of
treatment between Parties which ensures Parties are accorded FET and
“protection and security” in accordance with international law.41 Importantly for
NAFTA Parties, the customary international legal norm of minimum standard of
treatment is established as the minimum standard with FET and “protection and
security” not indicating an increased standard;42 this point provides clarity for
interpretation of the relevant standard by tribunals.43
33

Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] FCA 220, ¶ 51.
Canada, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, ¶ 54.
35 RUDOLF DOLZER AND CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 119 (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2008).
36 NAFTA, supra note 1, Article 1101.
37 Id. Article 1102.
38 Id. Article 1103.
39 Id. Article 1104.
40 Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35, at 178, 186.
41 NAFTA, supra note 1, Article 1105(1). [Minimum Standard of Treatment]
42 NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) Note of Interpretation (31 July 2001), online:
Global Affairs Canada.
43 Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35, at 126.
34
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The standards of FET and “protection and security” under both codified and
customary international law have evolved over time. While broad, the standard
of FET finds early roots in considerations related to treatment of foreign aliens,
which was outrageous, in bad faith, or illustrated an insufficiency of government
reaction which reasonably illustrates an unacceptable departure from
international standards.44 More recently the standard has been noted to be
evolving,45 with a focus on a lack of due process and fairness,46 which is
considered conceptually without the “threshold limitation that the conduct
complained of be egregious, outrageous, or shocking, or otherwise
extraordinary.”47 Factors such as transparency, contractual compliance,
procedural propriety, due process, good faith, and freedom from coercion have
all been considered by tribunals in the evaluation of the standard of treatment.48
Additionally, the standard of “protection and security” which initially applied to
protection from physical threats has been contemporarily interpreted to apply to
infringements on the rights of the investor through the application of law in the
host state.49 The focus conceptually has shifted beyond physical considerations to
centralize generally on access to judicial remedy and diminishment of an
investment.50
B. Expropriation

Expropriation, which sits at the crossroads of sovereignty and respect for
rights acquired by foreign investors, generally involves interference by the hostState with a property interest to the detriment of the investor.51 Article 1110(1)
indicates that Parties are restricted from direct or indirect expropriation, or
implementation of “measures tantamount to. . . expropriation,” except for a
public purpose, applied in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due
process, and with payment of equitable compensation.52 Compensation, which is
to reflect the fair market value of the investment at the time of expropriation, is
to be paid “without delay,” and shall be paid in a G7 currency or equivalent.53
Article 1110(7) indicates explicitly that measures relating to the “issuance,
44 Neer v Mexico, Opinion, US—Mexico General Claims Commission, 21 AJIL 555
(1927).
45 ADF Group Inc. v USA, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, 18 FILJ 195, ¶ 179 (2003).
46 Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy), Judgement, ICJ
Reports 15 (1989).
47 Pope & Talbot v Canada, Award on Merits (Phase 2), 122 ILR 352, ¶ 118 (2002);
Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35, at 129.
48 Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35, at 133-147; ROLAND KLÄGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 62-74 (Cambridge University Press 2013).
49 Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35, at 149.
50 Id. at 151-152, 162-166; CME v Czech Republic, Partial Award (13 September 2001), 9
ICSID Reports 121, ¶ 613; Lauder v Czech Republic, Award (3 September 2001), 9 ICSID
Reports 66, ¶ 314.
51 Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell , Law and Practice of Investment Treaties:
Standards of Treatment, (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009), at 321 [Newcombe &
Paradell]; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 35 at 89.
52 NAFTA, supra note 1, at Article 1110(1).
53 Id. Article 1110(2-6); Andrea K Bjorklund, NAFTA Chapter 11, COMMENTARIES ON
SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES (Oxford University Press, Chester Brown ed. 2013).
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revocation, limitation, or creation” of IP rights which are consistent with Chapter
17 are exempted from consideration as expropriation.54
What amounts to direct or indirect expropriation is a matter of debate and
divergence, with jurisprudence illustrating the inclusion of legislative, regulatory,
or administrative actions,55 “regulatory taking” and “creeping expropriation”
which, through application of law, devalues an investment over time.56 Tribunals
have focused not just on deliberate actions, such as the revocation of a certificate
or permit,57 but also on “incidental interference” with the property which, in form
or effect, neutralizes the economic benefit of the property,58 or deprives the
owner of a significant part of the “reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit.”59 The standard of “substantial deprivation” in relation to a property
right resulting in an economic loss has developed as a principal line of inquiry
when considering indirect expropriation.60 Finally, while the principles of public
purpose, non-discrimination, due process, and compensation encapsulated in
Article 1110(1) generally apply, where a non-discriminatory regulation, which
supports a public purpose, is enacted in accordance with principles of due
process and not in contravention to previously stated regulatory restraints, such
normal exercises of regulatory power are suggested to be outside the scope of
expropriation.61
C. Intellectual Property

Obligations relating to IP are addressed in Chapter 17 of NAFTA. Article
1701(1) establishes framework requirements on NAFTA Parties including: (i)
providing adequate protection and enforcement of IP rights while ensuring IP
measures are not trade inhibitors, and (ii) collectively actualizing previously
established IP Conventions (Geneva 1971, Berne 1971, Paris 1967, and UPOV
1978, 1991).62 Article 1702 empowers Parties to implement “more extensive” IP
rights as an alternative, provided these measures remain consistent with the
Agreement as a whole.63 Article 1703 provides for the application of the
principle of national treatment to the protection and enforcement of IP rights,
restricts the implementation of formalities or preconditions to acquisition of IP
rights (for instance, notice of copyright), and allows for derogation from this
standard regarding judicial and administrative procedures (such as a requirement
54

NAFTA, supra note 1, at Article 1110(7).
JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 231-232;
Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 51, at 326-327.
56 Brown, supra note 53; Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 51, at 324-325.
57 Goetz v Burundi, Award, 15 ICSID Review-FILJ 457 (2000) ¶ 124.
58 CME v. Czech Republic, supra note 50.
59 Metalclad v Mexico, Award, 5 ICSID Reports 209 (2002), ¶ 103.
60 Pope & Talbot, supra note 47; Sempra Energy v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, ¶ 284; Biwater v. Tanzani, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (2008);
Bonnitcha, supra note 55, at 248-255.
61 Methanex v. United States, Final Award (2005) ¶ 1-7; Saluka v. Czech Republic, Partial
Award (2006) ¶ 255.
62 NAFTA, supra note 1, Article 1701(1-2).
63 Id. NAFTA, Article 1702.
55
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to appoint a domestic agent) provided such derogation is consistent with the
previously noted IP Conventions.64
Article 1709 is the principle substantive NAFTA provision relating to
patents. Article 1709(1) requires Parties to make available patents for “all fields
of technology,” bearing the invention is “new,” is the result of an “inventive
step,” and is “capable of industrial application,” with Parties empowered to deem
“inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” equivalent to “nonobvious” and “useful.”65 Article 1709(2) and (3) provide for exceptions to the
minimum standard of patentability, particularly allowing Parties to exclude from
patentability inventions which pose a serious harm to life, health or the
environment (public order exception), as well as: surgical methods, nonmicrobial plants and animals, and biological processes for the production of nonmicrobial plants and animals.66 Parties are further required to: (i) provide for
patent protection for pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and agricultural products no
later than January 1, 1992,67 (ii) ensure that the acquisition of a patent provides
for exclusive rights relating to the product or process, with the option to provide
limited exceptions to such exclusive rights provided they are not unreasonably
prejudicial,68 and (iii) ensure patent rights may be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner with relation to the field, or geographic location for
production of the technology.69
Article 1709(8) indicates that Parties may only revoke a patent where
“grounds exist that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent,” or where
the issuance of a compulsory license has not remedied a lack of commercial
exploitation.70 Parties shall also permit the assignment, license, and transfer of
patents, integrate minimum patent-use authorization standards, place on the
defendant the onus in claims of product process infringement, and provide a
protection term of at minimum twenty years from the filing date, or seventeen
years from the grant date.71 It is also important to note that domestic enforcement
procedures relating to IP rights are available, and are required to be fair and
equitable, not unnecessarily cumbersome, costly or complicated, with domestic
adjudication based on the merits of the case in line with principles of due process
and subject to appeal.72

64 Id. NAFTA, Article 1703; Dorothy Schrader, Intellectual Property Provisions of the
NAFTA, Congressional Research Service: Report to Congress 94-59A (21 January 1994), at
3-4.
65 Id. Article 1709(1).
66 Id. Article 1709(2-3).
67 Id. Article 1709(4).
68 Id. Article 1709(5-6).
69 Id. Article 1709(7).
70 Id. Article 1709(8).
71 Id. Article 1709(9-12).
72 Id. Article 1714(2-4), 1715(1).
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IV. PATENT STANDARDS ACROSS NAFTA JURISDICTIONS
This section provides a discussion of the standards of patentability across
NAFTA jurisdictions, with a focus on the promise utility doctrine and sound
prediction. First, the theoretical background, legislative underpinning, and
applicable jurisprudence relating to the promise utility doctrine in Canada is
outlined. Second, patent standards in the United States are summarized, with an
emphasis on highlighting the “enablement” and “written description” doctrines.
Finally, patent standards applied in Mexico are briefly provided to illustrate
similarities and differences across NAFTA. The promise utility doctrine, as
developed in Canadian jurisprudence, is a unified articulation of core principles
relating to patent scope, adequacy of disclosure, and timing of patent, which,
while procedurally differentiated across NAFTA jurisdictions, goes to the heart
of the patent bargain applied by all Parties when considered in relation to
speculative patent practices.
A. Patent Law of Canada and the Patent Utility Doctrine

Patent protection, which in Canada is governed exclusively by the Patents
Act,73 is grounded in an essential bargain between the Crown and the inventor
based on adequate public disclosure of a “novel,” “unobvious,” and “useful”
invention in exchange for a term-limited monopoly intended to incentivize
innovation.74 Under the Patents Act, the invention in question must be a
patentable subject-matter, be new, non-obvious, useful, and accompanied by
sufficient disclosure in the patent itself.75 Patentable subject matter relates to “all
fields of technology,” a notion encompassed in the Section 2 definition of
“invention,” which includes “any new and useful art, process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter,” or an improvement to a previous
patent,76 including new uses of previously known compounds.77 An invention is
required to be new,78 and not anticipated by a single reference of prior art.79
Section 28.3 requires that the invention be non-obvious to a “person skilled in
the art” on the date of claim.80 Utility or “usefulness” which must be
demonstrated or soundly predicted at the claim date,81 is a further factor in the
requirement for sufficient disclosure in the patent under Section 27(3), which
73

Canada, Patents Act (1985), P-4.
STEPHEN J. PERRY & T. ANDREW CURRIER, CANADIAN PATENT LAW (Markham, Ontario:
LexisNexis, 2nd ed. 2014), at 39; ELIZABETH JUDGE & DANIEL GERVAIS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: THE LAW IN CANADA (Toronto, Canada: Carswell, 2nd ed. 2011) at 643-646; AZT,
supra note 28, ¶ 37; Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1989] 1
S.C.R., 1623, 60 D.L.R. (4th)223, 25 C.P.R.(3d) 257, 97 N.R. 185 (S.C.C.) ¶ 25; SanofiAventis v. Apotex Inc., [2009] F.C.J. No. 986 ¶ 358, 2009 FC 676 (F.C.), affd [2011] F.C.J.
No 1532, 2011 FCA 300 (F.C.A.) leave to appeal refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 19 (S.C.C.).
75 Canada Patents Act, supra note 73, § 2, 27(3), 27(8), 28.2(1), 28.3.
76 Id. § 2, 32.
77 Shell Oil Co. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner) [1982] 2 S.C.R. 536, ¶ 30-34.
78 Canada Patents Act, supra note 73, § 2, 28.1, 28.2.
79 Id. § 28.3.
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requires that disclosure describe the invention in such detail and clear terms as to
empower a person skilled in the art to bring about the desired effect.82 It is the
convergence of utility, sound prediction, and sufficient disclosure which brought
to light the patent utility doctrine.
The exclusive rights encapsulated in a patent are not absolute, but are subject
to satisfaction of the terms of the Patents Act and are reviewable and revocable
through judicial interpretation at the Federal Court.83 Patent utility has two core
dimensions: first, the invention must provide something of commercial value,
and second, the invention must be operable based on sufficient disclosure
allowing a person skilled in the art to bring about the desired promise of the
patent.84 Where no specific promised result is made in the specification, a “mere
scintilla” of utility is sufficient, but where a promised result is provided, utility
must be considered by this measure.85 The weighing of a patent’s utility against a
promise made in the specifications, a question of claim construction which
substantively underpins the promise utility doctrine, is an inquiry wedded to the
historical and theoretical justifications of the patent bargain.86 Being imported
from the English tradition, the promise utility doctrine has a longstanding judicial
history in Canada,87 with early authorities New Process Screw, Consolboard and
X. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner) stressing a focus not on an assessment of
the marketable value of the invention, but on the sufficiency of disclosure to
bring about the promised outcome.88 Early jurisprudence also illustrates the
importance of a balanced scope to patent claims, with speculative or unachieved
claims risking invalidation of the patent as a whole.89 The principal question is
whether a person skilled in the art, equipped with the disclosed specifications,
can produce the invention.90 More recent articulations in Teva Canada Ltd. v.
Pfizer Canada Inc. and the aforementioned Eli Lilly and Novopharm saga
reemphasized the well-established principle that patents, to have utility, must
attain their implicit and explicit promises.91
82

Canada Patents Act, supra note 73, § 27(3).
Id. § 42, 60(1).
84 Judge & Gervais, supra note 74, at 724; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Expert Report of
Ronald E. Dimock (26 January 2015) ¶ 66-67.
85 Laboratoires Servier v. Apotex Inc. [2008] F.C.J. No 1094, 2008 FC 825, ¶ 270;
Consolboard, supra note 22.
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87 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, vol. 29 (United Kingdom: Butterworth & Co, 3rd ed.
1960) at 59; Consolboard , supra note 22; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Government of Canada
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Utility must further be demonstrated or soundly predicted by the filing
date.92 The doctrine of sound prediction, which evolved in reply to patents for
broad classes of compounds with only isolated testing, allows for patent utility to
be asserted based on a factual basis and articulated line of reasoning which
would empower a person skilled in the art to recognize the prediction as sound.93
The three pillars of the doctrine of sound prediction were articulated in AZT to
include: (i) a factual basis for the prediction, (ii) an “articulated” and “sound”
line of reasoning as of the patent filing date, and (iii) proper disclosure.94
Speculation, even if eventually fulfilled, is not sufficient to satisfy the patent
bargain, as the public would be excluded from innovating while not gaining
anything further than a hypothesis.95 The doctrine of sound prediction is also
highly dependent upon sufficient disclosure, with both the factual evidence and
the line of reasoning supporting the prediction to be included.96 Regarding the
sufficiency of evidence to support the prediction, Eurocopter, relating to a
mechanical invention, held that while testing of all variations is not needed,
disclosure of some test data supporting the claimed configuration or composition
is sufficient, bearing the evidence is not speculative but supports the production
of the specific advantages.97 Relating to the interface of pharmaceutical
disclosure and sound prediction, Pfizer Canada v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC
citing AZT held that prior human trials relating to toxicity were not needed,
noting the inquiry relates to utility not safety, and highlighting that sound
prediction inherently indicates that “further work remains to be done.”98 Where a
sound prediction in a selection patent is made, proposed advantages must be
supported by sufficient evidence disclosed prior to the filing date,99 with such
evidence being tested in relation to the original group suggested to be
sufficient.100 Simply put, where a patent is based on a sound prediction, there is
an increased emphasis on sufficient disclosure, and the prediction must be
included in the description section of the patent,101 so as to provide a solid
teaching in exchange for the right to patent the invention.102 The promise utility
doctrine only applies where there is a “clear and unambiguous promise” in the
patent.103
92
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B. Patent Law of the United States and the Enablement and Written Description
Doctrines

American patent law is governed through Chapter 35 of the United States
Code.104 A list of patentable subject matter – nearly identical to the s.2 definition
of “invention” in Canada – is included in the §100 definition of “process,” with
patentable inventions identified in §101 as “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. . . or improvement thereof.”105
Novelty, as set out in §102 must be satisfied, requiring the patented subject
matter not to be previously patented, described in a publication, or publicly
available, with a one-year grace period provided negating prior disclosure made
by the inventor equating to prior art or anticipation.106 Recent reforms have also
implemented a “first to file” model bringing the U.S. practice in-line with
international practice.107 As per §103 the patented invention must also be nonobvious to a person skilled in the art.108 While the notion of utility is
encapsulated in “useful” under §101, American jurisprudence has elaborated
three distinct criteria: (i) the invention must provide credible utility to a person
skilled in the art (operability),109 (ii) the utility in question must be specific in
nature (specific) and (iii) provide a substantial or practical benefit.110
This bifurcated approach assesses not just utility, in as much as the invention
must have a specific use, but also operability, in as much as the invention must
be capable of achieving the benefit of the patent.111 A patent must include an
“assertion of utility,”112 a notion comparable to a promise in Canadian
jurisprudence, well-described in non-generic and specific language,113 which at
the time of filing is grounded in sufficient data supporting the desired results of
the invention.114 As set out in §112(a), patent specification shall contain “a
written description of the invention,” which must clearly enable a person skilled
in the art to “make and use” the claimed invention, including guidance on the
104

United States, Chapter 35, United States Code (as amended 2012) [35 U.S.C.].
Id. §100-101.
106 Id. §102(a-b).
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best mode contemplated for the invention, and shall include one or more specific
claims distinctly illustrating the subject-matter of the invention.115 The
enablement doctrine articulated in the §112 requirement of “written description”
is equitable to sufficient description obligations in Canada,116 and serves a dual
purpose, of “ensuring adequate disclosure” and dissuading overly broad claims
or “invention without experimentation.”117 While the promise utility doctrine
remains a construct of the Anglo-Canadian tradition, significant substantive
alignment can be found in the American approaches relating to the “written
disclosure,” “operability,” “enablement,” and “assertion of utility” doctrines.118
C. Patent Law of Mexico

Mexico, whose domestic IP system underwent significant reform in 2010,119
approaches utility through the doctrine of “industrial application.”120 An
invention, characterized as any human creation which transforms energy or
matter to address a concrete need,121 is required to be new, involve an “inventive
activity” and be capable of industrial application.122 Novelty and nonobviousness are assessed in relation to the state of the art on the filing date, with
a one-year grace period provided for patenting.123 As per Article 12, the patent
must include a written description of: (i) everything new which is contributed to
the state of the art, (ii) the current state of the art, (iii) the creative process which
is non-obvious to a person skilled in the art, (iv) the practical utility or use in
commerce, and (v) the claimed essential characteristics.124 Article 47 stresses that
the description needs sufficient clarity and comprehensiveness to enable a full
understanding and actualization of the invention by a person skilled in the art,
including best-known methods of execution, and underlying information
establishing the industrial applicability.125 Additional information may also be
requested or required by patent authority to support any information provided in
the patent application during the processing.126 Insufficient disclosure or
“descriptive insufficiency” is seen as synonymous with “lack industrial
applicability,” but admittedly these concepts are underdeveloped.127
115
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V. COMPATIBILITY OF THE PROMISE UTILITY DOCTRINE AND OBLIGATIONS
UNDER NAFTA
This section will evaluate the consistency of the promise utility doctrine with
NAFTA obligations as seen in the cases of Zyprexa (olanzapine) and Strattera
(atomoxetine). Three key questions will be discussed: (i) if the promise utility
doctrine denies treatment guaranteed under the minimum standard of treatment;
(ii) if the application of the promise utility doctrine results in direct or indirect
expropriation; (iii) if the promise utility doctrine is incompatible with the
established IP norms. First, the reasonably expected standard of treatment under
Article 1102, 1103, 1105, and 1703 is considered. Second, an inquiry of
expropriation under Article 1110 is provided. Lastly, the promise utility doctrine
is reviewed in relation to international IP norms and subsequent alignment with
Article 1709. The promise utility doctrine is an evolutionary articulation of
longstanding NAFTA compliant IP principles driven by an enhanced need for
enforcement of adequate disclosure standards to maintain the patent bargain in a
new and rapidly developing age of innovation.
A. An Inquiry into the Standard of Treatment

In evaluating the standard of treatment under Article 1105, core principles of
consideration are FET and “legitimate expectations.”128 Regarding the former, in
Waste Management II it was noted that Article 1105 does not create an openended review mechanism;129 rather the focus remains on egregious conduct or
lack of due process, with the tribunal suggesting the FET principle is violated in
cases of state conduct which is “arbitrary, grossly unfair . . . [or] lack[s] due
process.”130 Where there is a denial of justice, a systemic analysis is often
conducted,131 as illustrated in Metalclad (refusal by a municipal authority to issue
construction permit), Tecmed (revocation of a license to operate), Loewen
(propriety of court proceedings), and Petrobart (state intervention in the
execution of a judgment).132 As noted in BilCon, the categorical formula put
forward in Waste Management while “particularly apt” also conveys a high
threshold of conduct to equate to a breach of Article 1105.133 The national
treatment and most favorable nation standards grounded in Article 1102 and
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1103 respectively, also incorporate factors such as “like circumstances,” and if
the measure places a foreign investment at a “disproportionate disadvantage.”134
The judicial invalidations of patent 113 relating to Zyprexa (olanzapine) and
patent 735 relating to Strattera (atomoxetine) were made in accordance with the
standards of FET and national treatment. While Eli Lilly claim the 113 and 735
patent decisions specifically, and the underlying jurisprudence supporting the
promise utility doctrine more broadly, are “improper and discreditable,”135 I find
this position difficult to support. In both cases, Eli Lilly received fair and
impartial protection and treatment under the law, with transparent and
substantively sound forums for due process. As noted in Mondev, when
considering judicial decisions, the test is not if the result was “surprising,” but if
the result calls into question the “juridical propriety” of the decision, with
international tribunals explicitly recognized as “not courts of appeal.”136 An
Article 1105 inquiry is concerned with identification of a denial of justice,
discrimination,137 or arbitrariness in the judicial process,138 rather than providing
a substantive review of valid decisions made by domestic authorities.139 The
invalidation of the 113 and 735 patents were grounded in longstanding legal
principles established far prior to the establishment of NAFTA.140 If, as noted in
Bilcon, the investor can expect, absent any changes in domestic law, to have a
case assessed on the “merits,” based on the “same legal standards applied to
applicant[s] generally,” then indeed Eli Lilly did receive their legitimate
expectations of a sound legal framework and developed patent law, contrary to
their assertion.141 The 113 and 735 patents simply failed on their merits, which is
not a valid violation of the principle of FET. Deference must always be paid to
domestic courts in the determination of property and application of interpretive
techniques unless such action calls into question the judicial propriety of the
system.
B. An Inquiry into the Expropriation

When considering under Article 1110 if a measure is, or is tantamount to,
expropriation directly or indirectly, tribunals have taken differing approaches: (i)
looking “exclusively” at the effects of the measure to the investment in question
(Metalclad, Pope & Talbot), (ii) looking at the effects more broadly, subject to
outlined exceptions (Methanex), and (iii) a balancing approach which considers
both the effects and the characteristics of the measure (Feldman).142
Conceptually, direct and indirect expropriation are often differentiated on the
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grounds of the impact of the measure on the legal title of the investment,143 with
the phrases “tantamount to expropriation” interpreted as equating to indirect
expropriation.144 An “investment” for the purposes of Article 1110(1) includes
legitimately acquired property interests – both tangible and intangible.145
Two distinct lines of inquiry relating to the influence of the “effects” of
indirect expropriation exist, exemplified by Metalclad and Pope & Talbot
respectively.146 In Metalclad, where denial of a municipal construction permit
and passing by the state of an “Ecological Decree” inhibited operation of a
proposed hazardous waste landfill, the tribunal defined expropriation to include
“covert or incidental interference” with a property interest which deprives the
investor “in whole or significant part” of the “reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit” of the property.147 Subsequent decisions in Occidental v.
Ecuador (II), and Chemtura v. Canada have somewhat distanced themselves
from the “broad definition” applied in Metalclad, adopting without application
the standard.148 An alternative approach was applied in Pope & Talbot, where an
export quota on softwood lumber was set in place, with the tribunal classifying
the ability to export the product as an independent property interest from the
business as a whole,149 with expropriation of that property interest required to be
a “substantial deprivation.”150 The standard of “substantial deprivation” has been
endorsed in Fireman’s Fund and Chemtura,151 albeit prior to a balancing
exercise.152 Subsequent applications of the Pope & Talbot standard have
highlighted various practices which amount to indirect expropriation, including
notably, deprivation of control over the investment, or deprivation of property in
whole or in part,153 and noted the need for the substantial interference to actually
cause economic harm154 and involve deprivation of all or a significant part of the
property interest.155
An exception to the general rule against expropriation was established in
Methanex, where an environmentally focused regulatory scheme was upheld on
the grounds that a “non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose,”
implemented in accordance with principles of due process and previous
143
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international commitments, was not deemed expropriation.156 Similarly, in
Saluka enforcement of banking regulations resulting in liquidation of the
investment was upheld as a valid exercise of regulatory authority “aimed at the
general welfare.”157 Subsequent tribunals have applied the requirements of public
policy and due process from Methanex to cases involving cancelation of a tariff
index framework, and cancelation of an operation permit, under the “police
powers” exception for valid exercises of domestic authority.158 A further
approach was adopted by the tribunal in Tecmed, where cancelation of a license
to operate after a year of operation was deemed to be indirect expropriation on
the grounds of reasonable expectations, and rejecting a broad exception,
alternatively indicated the need for proportionality between the measure and the
aim sought.159 Likewise, in Azurix and LG&E the tribunal reiterated the general
welfare exception requiring the measure not be “obliviously disproportionate to
the need being addressed.”160 Finally, in Feldman v. Mexico the principal
question pertained to if the measure was a valid governmental activity; the
tribunal taking a holistic view of the circumstance, balanced the character and
effects of the measure and considered: (i) the general nature of the measure, (ii)
the rational public purpose, (iii) the deprivation of rights, and (iv) retention of
control of the investment.161
The judicial invalidations of patent 113 and patent 735 were not
expropriation of a valid property interest under Article 1110(1). First, the
invalidation of the aforementioned patents through application of the promise
utility doctrine extinguished the validity of the property interest for the purposes
of Article 1139 and 1110(1), as only domestic law may determine the validity of
a property interest.162 Second, application of the promise utility doctrine did not
amount to a substantial deprivation under Pope & Talbot. While the judicial
proceedings resulted in the patents being invalidated, Eli Lilly had enjoyed their
exclusive rights for nearly the full term, still retained the ability to sell the
products, albeit at a reduced margin of sale, and still retained a highly successful
enterprise with a wide spectrum of financial and property interests. The
aforementioned patents were only two in a stable of IP interests by Eli Lilly, the
depth, breadth, or value of which was not substantially diminished. Looking at
substantial deprivation holistically as was done in Feldman, the enforcement of
patent rights serves as a valid public purpose, with invalidation being the sole
proportionate outcome. Maintenance of the patent bargain by way of requiring
156
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the patent to achieve the claimed end, ensures the public is provided with
adequate instructions to achieve the benefit of the invention in return for the term
limited monopoly, and is vital to guaranteeing that innovation remains enabled to
develop and build upon the prior art. Finally, if presumptively expropriation
prima facie could be found, the actions relating to the 113 and 735 patents are
valid exceptions under the Methanex, Saluka, Azurix and LG&E “police powers
doctrine.” The promise utility doctrine is a non-discriminatory application of
legislation, in accordance with due process and prior international commitments,
and in support of an integral public purpose – upholding the patent bargain.
C. An Inquiry into Intellectual Property

When assessing the exemption of measures relating to the issuance or
revocation of IP rights under Article 1110(7), alignment of the measure with
obligations under Article 1709(1) and 1709(7-8) is a principal area of focus.
First, Article 1709(1) contains substantively equivalent language to TRIPS
Article 27(1),163 requiring patents be allowed in “all fields of technology”
bearing they are “new,” involve an “inventive step,” and are “capable of
industrial application,” with “inventive step” and “capable of industrial
application” synonymous with “non-obvious” and “useful.” These notions are
each integrated into the domestic legislation of NAFTA Parties through the
definitions of “invention” in Canada,164 “process” in the United States,165 and
“industrial application” in Mexico.166 Additionally, the explicit reference that
“inventive step” and “capable of industrial application” are equivalent to “nonobvious” and “useful,”167 implicitly imports a recognition of the parallel legal
traditions and subsequent differential jurisprudence.
Second, Article 1709(7) prohibits patent discrimination on the grounds of the
type of technology, or place of production. While it is claimed that
pharmaceutical patents are disproportionately targeted,168 as a component of the
Common Law, in actuality the promise utility doctrine is applied across all
patents regardless of technology, and has been utilized in consideration of both
mechanical and chemical patents.169 Any disproportionality in form or effect is a
result of the endemic nature of speculative and overly broad patent practices in
the pharmaceutical industry generally.170 Third, Article 1709(8) provides that a
patent may be revoked where grounds exist which would have justified refusal
for the patent to be granted. Illustrating the alignment of the promise utility
163 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994,
UNTS Volume 1867, No 31874, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Article 27(1).
164 Canada Patents Act, supra note 73, s. 2, 28.
165 35 U.S.C., supra note 104, §100-101.
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Company v. NOVA Chemicals Corporation, [2014] FC 844.
170 Ikechi Mgbeoji and Byron Allen, Patent First, Litigate Later! The Scramble for
Speculative and Overly Broad Genetic Patents: Implications for Access to Health Care and
Biomedical Research, 2 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 2, 83-98 (2003).
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doctrine, the utility of an invention as noted in AZT must be demonstrated or
soundly predicted by the filing date, based on a sound line of reasoning, or the
patent would be “offering nothing to the public but wishful thinking.”171
Fourth, some divergence in the legislative implementation of international IP
standards is tolerated under international law,172 with the independence of patent
jurisdictions reinforced in Article 4bis of the Paris Convention.173 As seen in
Harvard Mouse, where a method patent was allowed but the patent on the higher
life form rejected on the interpretation of “invention” in contrast to other
jurisdictions, while global trade makes it desirable for differing IP jurisdictions
to come to “similar legal results,” it is important to allow for statutory
interpretation based on the purpose of the Act contextualized by key public
policy concerns, which at times brings about divergent results.174 The utility
standard as applied in Canada, under the promise utility doctrine, and in the
United States, under the doctrines of “enablement” and “written description,”
achieve technically and substantively similar results through enforcing differing
aspects of the patent bargain.175
Fifth, while substantively similar, the divergence between the Canadian and
U.S. approaches to utility is procedural in nature.176 Under the U.S. system, once
the patent holder proves an infringement has occurred, the infringing party is
estopped from questioning the utility of the invention, leaving utility and patent
bargain inquiries practically occurring under the doctrines of “written
disclosure,” “operability,” “enablement,” and “assertion of utility.”177
Sixth, the uniform substantive principles applied across NAFTA
jurisdictions aim to address an important public policy concern – the prevention
of speculative patents – with each jurisdiction’s judiciary placing emphasis on
differing operative elements of the domestic patent framework. On utility the
NAFTA jurisdictions have developed a common-but-differentiated approach on
utility where Canada utilizes the promise utility doctrine coupled with sound
prediction,178 the United States cites operability, enablement and written
description doctrines,179 and Mexico views “descriptive insufficiency” as
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synonymous with “lack [of] industrial applicability,”180 each achieving the same
technical result of ensuring fulfillment of the promise of the patent.
Lastly, a critical consideration in the overall analysis hinges on the
suggestion that in upholding one norm (the promise utility doctrine), the SCC has
invariably breached another set of international legal norms – namely, FET.
However, such a pre-emptive conclusion assumes both that international legal
norms are fixed with objectively identifiable components, and that any perceived
interpretive deviation by domestic courts is a ‘violation’ rather than an
articulation of an emerging normative standard underlying opino juris.181 For
instance, the definition of “ship” applied domestically by the Greek judiciary
under the global regime on civil liabilities for oil pollution damage, has
influenced the approach adopted by Parties under the International Maritime
Organization (“IMO”) regime.182 Similarly, UK jurisprudence has at times been
influential in the interpretation and application of law under the European Court
of Human Rights.183 The approach adopted in Canadian jurisprudence grows
from a unique mix of market circumstances which nurtured the promise utility
doctrine, namely a market saturated by highly aggressive foreign competitors
who, through use of overly aggressive patenting practices, have allowed
vulnerabilities which invariably are exploited by domestic competitors.
Articulation of the promise utility doctrine is responsive to speculative patent
practices of market actors, and upholds the theoretical underpinnings of the
patent system.

VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The promise utility doctrine, as seen applied in the cases of Zyprexa and
Strattera, illustrates application of longstanding legal principles to uphold the
public purpose of the patent bargain, and dissuade overly broad patent practices.
Indeed, the invalidations of the 113 and 735 patents initially seemed
counterintuitive, but were legally sound when considered juxtaposed to a
doctrinal evaluation of the patents’ promise and relative disclosure. Practically,
the 113 and 735 patents failed for lack of utility, not by virtue of a lack of
commercial application, but by virtue of the fact that the patent did not
functionally provide for the thing that was patented. The patent is an accord with
an inventor allowing a short term monopoly over a specific new or novel process
or thing, in exchange for accurate disclosure – in particular, based on verifiable,
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quantifiable, and enduring findings supporting a sound prediction – allowing
another skilled in the art to build upon that knowledge once in the public domain.
If a patent is allowed to make multiple expansive promised applications, then
indeed it should be measured against the actualization of those proposals or risk,
broadly inhibiting innovation and market competition in general. This was never
the intention of the patent and is a distortion of the system.
While procedural divergence may be identified across NAFTA jurisdictions
relating to a utility, theoretically and substantively, the Parties apply arguably
equitable technical inquiries. The invalidations of the 113 and 735 patents were
in line with IP obligations under Chapter 17 of NAFTA, and as such, are
exempted from consideration as expropriation under Article 1110(7).
Furthermore, the invalidations in-and-of-themselves extinguished the valid
property interests underlying an expropriation inquiry, with the judicial
application of the promise utility doctrine through a practice of due process,
upheld as a valid and proportionate exercise of domestic authority, should such
an inquiry occur. It would be a distortion and contrary to the object and purpose
of the treaty to suggest that the standard established under Article 1709
accommodates overly broad or unsubstantiated patent practices.
The promise utility doctrine demonstrates a natural and logical articulation
of patent law which is consistent with the substantive and procedural
requirements of NAFTA. The elements which make up the promise utility
doctrine are derived from the longstanding synergies of inventiveness and
adequate disclosure in relation to the patent bargain, and are grounded in the
principle of FET treatment. In essence, the promise utility doctrine enforces the
material point of the patent system: a specific and adequately disclosed invention
which manifestly achieves the inventive promise of the patent. Overly broad or
speculative patent practices have chilling effect on innovation through the
creation of bottle-necks or inadvertent research monopolies. In an age of rapid
technological innovation, the promise utility doctrine acts to soften the
suppressive effects of speculative patent practices on innovation and trade in a
manner consistent with NAFTA.

